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the last economics panel of the day, sponsored by The 
Brattle Group.  I take off my Fordham Competition Law 
Institute hat, and I now put on my Director of Global 
Development at The Brattle Group hat for this panel. 
I’m excited about the panel because I’ve 
been somewhat exposed to this subject of structural 
modeling, but I think to many it is either not heard 
of or somewhat mysterious. 
So my first question is — show of hands, not 
being bashful — how many of you believe you know what 
structural modeling is? 
[Show of hands] 
Okay, a couple of economists, and that’s all 
we have.  That’s good.  That’s very good. 
Well, you’re going to find out something 
this afternoon because we have really an incredible 
panel of economists and practitioners.   
First, two to my left, Dr. Ariel Pakes at 
Harvard, who is, for those in the know, coauthor with 
Steven Berry and James Levinsohn of a fundamental 
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paper in this area, the “BLP paper,” which may be in 
some sense described or not. 
Dr. Ali Yurukoglu out of Stanford at the far 
end also has a seminal paper, the Crawford and 
Yurukoglu paper involving de-bundling of media, for 
those in the know. 
To my left, Art Burke at Davis Polk, who has 
actually litigated structural modeling, which was the 
first time, and it doesn’t happen very often.  Art 
also does merger work. 
Ken Schwartz, my former partner at Skadden 
Arps, has to deal with all types of data, modeling, 
and what economists like to do at the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
and so has been exposed in various degrees to this 
kind of analysis. 
I’m going to turn it over right away to 
Ariel and Ali — they can divide it up how they want — 
to first describe what structural modeling is and what 
do you need to do it, and then we’ll hop into some 
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follow-up questions from that. 
PROF. PAKES:  Ali and I made slides.  I 
didn’t know quite what to do, so what I decided to do 
is —  
[Slide] Structural modeling is a way of 
doing things.  It’s not any particular thing.  What I 
decided I would do is go over one example and then 
compare it to what you would do on the same example if 
you weren’t doing structural modeling and show you the 
advantages of doing structural modeling.  The simple 
example is going to be a merger analysis. 
[Slide] The big advantage of structural 
modeling is it gives you a consistent framework to do 
counterfactuals — or but-for modeling, if you like.  
What “consistent” means in this context is the 
conclusions follow directly from the assumptions.  In 
the case I’m going to go over now, the assumptions and 
limitations have been studied. 
The advantage of the conclusions following 
directly from the assumptions is you can actually 
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question one of the assumptions and we can see how it 
changes the result.  Straightforwardly, hopefully. 
Let me give you the classic example.  How do 
we analyze price setting?  I need three things to 
analyze price setting: 
• I need a model that tells me the demand 
for a given product, given the prices and 
characteristics of all products that are being 
marketed.  That’s what we call a demand system. 
• I need a model for the cost of producing 
those products.  These are two things that have to be 
estimated.  They are primitives. 
• Third, I need an assumption on how prices 
are set, given the demand for these products and the 
cost for the products. 
[Slide] The assumption derives from John 
Nash, who won the Nobel Prize for it.  It is a rest 
point.  What each firm is doing is it is choosing a 
price to maximize its profits given what every other 
firm is doing, and every firm is doing this. 
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Why do we look there for the rest point?  
It’s because if a firm is doing the best it can given 
what everybody else is doing, there’s no reason for it 
to change its actions. If there was a firm that wasn’t 
doing the best it can given what everybody else was 
doing, so it wasn’t in a Nash equilibrium, you would 
expect it to eventually change its price.  The rest 
point assumption is a natural place to look for how 
prices would change. 
If you were setting prices, the rest point 
actually is very intuitive.  The way you get it is the 
following: You increase the price of a good by a 
dollar.  For everybody who stays with your good and 
doesn’t leave you get an extra dollar.  For those who 
leave you lose the markup price minus marginal cost.  
When those two things equate, the equilibrium is 
there. 
I keep on increasing my price as long as I 
get more from the people who stay than I lose from the 
people who leave.  What do I lose from everybody who 
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leaves?  The markup price minus marginal cost. 
That’s the characterization of equilibrium.  
If you get that, you’ve got a Nash equilibrium. 
[Slide] I want to show you how we have done 
and why we use this.  It’s easy to check whether this 
notion of pricing equilibrium makes sense in a given 
market provided you have the demand system and the 
cost system. 
Let me say the disadvantage of going this 
route is that it takes data and time.  It’s going to 
take more time and more data than the standard way of 
doing things, which I’ll come back to in a second. 
It’s easy to check because if I do have a 
demand system — and that’s where this BLP stuff comes 
in — the price should equal cost plus a markup.  
You’re going to keep on increasing the price until 
this condition is met; and as long as you have 
marginal costs — you know price equals markup — the 
increment of people will equal the markup.  The gain 
from the people who stay will equal just the markup, 
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and you can take the markup directly down from the 
demand system. 
[Slide] Let me give you an example.  This is 
a paper that just came out in the American Economics 
Review by Tom Wollmann.  Somebody referred to the last 
paper of Tom Wollmann in the morning when I was here. 
He had a separate demand system.  We 
regressed the prices on the determinants of cost that 
he had in his data and the predicted markup that came 
from this separate demand system.  Then we look at the 
fit of this equation: how well does it do? 
The coefficient of the markup, which we take 
directly down, should be 1.  That’s what the theory 
says it should be.  Then I’m going to look at how well 
we fit over time. 
Let me just say, given the demand system at 
least, he didn’t have measures of cost.  Typically for 
economic research cost is proprietary.  But if we’re 
at the Department of Justice, they can sometimes 
requisition it, so you might be able to do better than 
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this. 
[Slide] These are the estimates.  I want you 
to look at two things.  This is a published paper.  We 
took the demand system from the published paper and 
did these regressions. 
You get an R2 of either 0.86 (if you don’t 
put in time dummies) or 0.94.  That’s about as good a 
fit as any equation in the social sciences, period, 
never mind economics. 
It’s true that it’s a cross-sectional 
relationship and there are big differences in the 
characteristics of these different products, but when 
you go over time, nothing is changing for a given 
product over time, same characteristic exactly over 
time.  And the cost functions don’t change, just wages 
is the only thing, and they don’t change. 
[Slide] So the only thing that’s changing is 
the markup.  How is the markup determined?  It’s 
determined from the demand system, and it’s determined 
depending on who’s competing with you.  Therefore, the 
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things that are changing the markup over time are just 
the number of competitors and where they are, how 
close they are in characteristic space to your 
product. 
When you do that, you still get 60 percent 
R2, which again for the social sciences is incredibly 
high. 
[Slide] Now let me go back to the merger 
analysis.  I told you how these prices are set, and I 
showed you that it sort of works, at least in this one 
case.  Actually, it works in many cases, which is the 
reason it has sort of taken over. 
What happens after a merger?  Say two 
products merge.  Now I’m going to increase my price by 
a dollar.  I get a dollar from everybody who stays.  
Some people leave.  I lose the markup on those people, 
on my first group, but now some of them go to the 
other good.  Is that clear? 
Seeing some of them go to the other good, I 
don’t lose so much.  I get the markup on the other 
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good, and price keeps going up, and that’s the reason 
prices are higher after the merger. 
You can show just by writing down the thing 
that in this Nash equilibrium after the merger the 
amount the price goes up is a function of the 
diversion ratio, the fraction of the people who leave 
who go to your second good.  That’s all that is. 
You take all those people who leave and look 
at how many are going to go to the second good (that’s 
the diversion ratio) and then the markup on the second 
good, because if the markup on the second good is very 
high, you keep on increasing price because that’s 
where you’re getting it back. 
If we have the demand system and the current 
prices, we can compute merged prices.  Again, you have 
to have the demand system and you have to have the 
current prices — that’s nontrivial — but once you get 
it, it’s pretty easy. 
[Slide] What would you compare this to that 
came before?  There are two, really.   
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There is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), which is an index of concentration in the 
industry.  What’s wrong with the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index?  You can derive this index exactly from a 
theory when all the goods are exactly the same.  
Different companies are putting different quantities 
on the market, maybe because they have different cost 
functions, but the goods are exactly the same. 
Where the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index comes 
from is you’re assuming that goods are either perfect 
substitutes, so if you increase the price a little bit 
everybody goes to the second good, or they’re not 
substitutes at all.  If they’re perfect substitutes, 
they go in the denominator of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index; if they’re not, they don’t count at all.  Is 
that clear? 
That’s just never true.  Goods actually are 
a partial substitute.  There is a fraction of them 
(the diversion ratio) that is between zero and 1, and 
you can never get an accurate measure of market power 
 13 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
from this thing. 
Moreover, it’s going to end up leading you 
to unnecessary debates about what’s in the 
denominator.  Is the thing in the denominator or not?  
Really, it’s just partially in the denominator at some 
level. 
[Slide] That was what was wrong with the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  I’m not the first one to 
know this.   
The thing that came later was this Upward 
Price Pressure (UPP).  What is Upward Price Pressure?  
It’s just what I told you a second ago: it’s a 
diversion ratio times the markup of the second good.  
That’s all it is. 
The reason that you’ve heard about it is 
sometimes it can be approximated without doing the 
whole demand system.  Especially for producer goods, 
you can go ask producers, “What fraction would leave 
if you increased the price by $100 — or whatever — 
$1000, whatever it is?”  You can get some idea of what 
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the diversion ratio is without estimating the whole 
demand system. 
It’s much harder for retail goods, by the 
way, because for retail goods you have to have a real 
sample of all the people who are going to choose.  It 
has to be random.  For producer goods you might know 
actually who are the people who consume this good. 
It’s an improvement over HHI because it 
takes into account what partial substitution really 
is. 
The problem with it is it evaluates 
everything at premerger prices, so it takes the markup 
premerger and the fraction that would move premerger.  
Is that clear? 
So, what’s really happening with the merger 
is it’s true that one will tend to go up by the markup 
times the diversion ratio to the second good, but the 
second good is also increasing its price.  Is that 
clear? 
That will feed back into the first good.  If 
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you just do the diversion ratio on the first good, 
it’s not a Nash equilibrium for the second good.  It 
was a Nash equilibrium before — it was doing the best 
it could — and now you’ve changed the second good’s 
price, so it’s not a Nash equilibrium anymore.  
Therefore, you have to solve for it jointly.  That’s 
what’s called the diversion ratio.   
The UK Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA) has started to look at that.  It’s still partial 
because it holds other competitors constant, just the 
two goods it does together, but again it’s a step in 
the right direction. 
[Slide] I’m going to give it to Ali now.  
You can go from this to much more complicated things, 
but Ali will start that.  Maybe I’ll come back. 
Another one of the things that have just 
started to be used, and actually we’re using it in 
stuff, is vertical markets.  Ali can talk to you about 
that in bundling. 
MR. KEYTE:  Ariel, let me ask you one 
 16 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
question, though, before you –  
PROF. PAKES:  One more word and then you can 
ask.    
Let me just say that the other thing that is 
pretty easy to do if you have a demand system is 
product repositioning, which is something that has 
been ignored largely in court cases, and I can show 
you industries where I know it’s of vital importance.  
People can reposition products faster than they can 
move prices in several industries. 
MR. KEYTE:  That was going to be my 
question.  Most people who have done at least merger 
work are familiar with UPP and its tendency to be 
static and not account for supply responses from other 
competitors, new entrants.  How do you model that? 
PROF. PAKES:  Let me just say there are 
partial models for all of that.  I want to give it to 
Ali so he can tell you about vertical stuff.  I think 
Ali might tell you something about entry also.   
The more you get into it, the harder it is 
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and the more assumptions you’re going to have to make.  
When making assumptions, at least you know what you’re 
assuming when you get an answer.  So, it’s not 
necessarily bad, but it does take more time and it 
does require more assumptions.   
We can do entry.  I’m doing it right now 
actually. 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  Good afternoon.  Thank you 
to the organizers for inviting me.  I also prepared 
some slides. 
I’m going to take a step back.  I was asked 
to talk a little bit about the ingredients that go 
into a structural model. 
[Slide] I just want to give a high-level 
overview of those ingredients, basically three steps: 
a specification, a model estimation, and then a 
simulation.  I’ll discuss what’s good about doing 
things this way and what are the pitfalls. 
I have a running example of thinking about 
the question of: What would happen if the government 
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regulated unbundling of cable television, which is a 
paper I wrote with Greg Crawford several years ago. 
[Slide] These empirical economic models — 
that’s what I like to call them more than the term 
“structural”; I think structural is hard to 
understand, and people react weirdly to it, so these 
are really just empirical economic models. 
There are three steps: 
• The first step is you have to specify a 
theoretical model of consumer and firm behavior.  As 
Ariel alluded to, this can be very general.  You can 
have many different effects.  It gets harder the more 
effects you add.  The most well-trodden path is merger 
simulation, where basically there are consumers like 
us buying stuff from firms that sell directly to them 
and the set of products is fixed. 
I’m not going to get into the details of 
most of this stuff.  This specification ends up being 
a system of mathematical equations with lots of Greek 
letters.  Ariel worked out a lot of this stuff in his 
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career and did a lot of important work.   
At the end of the day you get a map — it’s 
on the computer — where you plug in inputs like: How 
much do consumers like this product?  How much does 
this product cost to make?  You get outputs like 
prices and market shares. 
• The next step is to estimate the 
parameters of those models.  For different parameters 
you’ll get back different answers for what prices 
ought to be and market shares ought to be in the 
market. 
• The estimation step is to discipline the 
model by choosing the parameters so that the 
predictions of the model match what we’ve seen 
previously in the data.  We’re calibrating the 
parameters of the model so that we’re predicting what 
has happened in the past, and that gives us the 
confidence to then take that model and those 
parameters and simulate alternative scenarios by 
changing the rules of the model.  For example, you can 
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take a firm out or you can merge two firms, and those 
parameters will give you a prediction for what should 
happen now. 
[Slide] I’ll talk a little bit more about 
this, but at a high level the benefit is being able to 
explicitly use economic theory and state your 
assumptions.  Furthermore, it allows you to combine 
related data sets, data sets from different areas of 
the market that regression analysis or UPP analysis 
might not be easy to combine. 
The downside is that these are very 
computationally intensive, and they have many 
assumptions.  That combination means it’s hard to test 
the robustness of those assumptions.  Sometimes it’s 
just very costly to try all the different combinations 
of assumptions, and you’re open to the criticism that, 
“Well, if you change this assumption, this might not 
work, but you didn’t have enough time or resources to 
try that and see what would happen.” 
[Slide] Here’s the example of cable 
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bundling.  Think circa 2005 — so before Netflix, 
Amazon, all that stuff — there were movements to 
mandate unbundling of channels, actually coming from 
Republicans in Congress for a variety of reasons, and 
there was an antitrust case. 
The thing is we’ve never actually seen 
unbundling happen — in every country the TV providers 
bundle — let alone in many comparable environments, 
where you could do sort of a regression analysis and 
see what a bundled world would look like compared to 
an unbundled world. 
How do we evaluate such a policy using 
economics and data?  It seems like something an 
economist ought to be able to say something about.  
It’s not a crazy question. 
[Slide] This is how we do it.  We build a 
model of the industry.  We bring in data on that 
industry — basically how much time do people spend 
watching various channels, how much money do they 
spend for products, what packages do they buy — and 
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then we combine that with economic theory to get this 
machinery to simulate unbundling.  We can actually get 
an answer this way. 
That answer comes with all the assumptions 
that go into the model, but you can discuss those 
assumptions, you can debate those assumptions, and 
actually get an answer. 
MR. KEYTE:  Ali, let me ask you one question 
in the middle of that.  What if you can’t replicate 
when you start the actual world?  How much are you 
allowed, in a sense, within the profession, the 
industry, to assume certain things away to get it to 
solve, to get it to replicate before you import the 
change? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  There are multiple levels 
to that question.   
Imagine you had all the data you could ever 
want.  In that hypothetical world, if you can’t 
replicate the previous world, then I think you’re not 
good enough at modeling to be engaging in this 
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exercise. 
There’s another world where you made your 
discovery or request for a bunch of data, and you get 
a bunch of data that’s not very good, and you’re 
stuck.  Then you start making assumptions, and I think 
we should allow for not matching every possible 
feature of the world. 
MR. KEYTE:  We’ll talk to the lawyers here 
about some of the Daubert issues that are raised by 
that. 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  I don’t want to dominate 
the whole discussion, but let me just quickly run 
through. 
[Slide] In the cable bundling specification, 
here’s what the model has to tell you in words.   
You have to say, “Who are the agents?”  The 
agents are the entities in the model.  You have 
consumers like us who buy TV; you have the cable and 
satellite distributors; and you have the content 
makers.  That’s one way to cut off an industry from 
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the rest of the world.  Those are your players. 
You have to ask, “What are those agents 
allowed to do?”  Consumers can choose what package to 
buy, what channels to watch, how much time to watch 
each channel.  The cable and satellite firms can 
choose what prices to charge and what channels to 
include, what packages to offer.  The content makers 
can, for example, negotiate prices with cable and 
satellite distributors. 
There are some actions that they take in the 
real world that I’ve left out here because it’s a 
model, like content makers deciding how good or how 
many programs to make. 
Then you have to ask: What happens?  What 
are their payoffs?  What is their benefit of taking 
certain actions when other agents take other actions?  
Consumers want to entertain themselves and not spend 
too much money, and firms usually just want to make 
money. 
Finally — and Ariel talked a bunch about 
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this — you need some equilibrium notion that pins down 
what actions are going to be taken by each of the 
agents. 
[Slide] The next step is the estimation 
step, which James asked about.  In the cable case, you 
input tastes for channels, like how much do people 
like different channels.  You can have heterogeneous 
agents, where some agents like ESPN, some like The 
Food Network, some like a little bit of ESPN, some 
like a little bit of The Food Network.  When you put 
in those parameters, you get back what prices and 
choices should be according to the model, and you just 
rerun the model over and over at different levels of 
those parameters until you’re matching what you see in 
the data. 
If you tried to put in parameters where 
people really love The Weather Channel, then your 
model would say, “Well, The Weather Channel’s price 
should be really high.”  But when you look at the 
data, The Weather Channel’s price is not very high, so 
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your model is going to say people don’t like The 
Weather Channel that much. 
That’s the discipline. 
[Slide] In the bundling example we match 
things like the market shares for each package in each 
local market, the prices charged by the cable and 
satellite operators, how much time was being watched 
on each channel, the spread or the variance in time 
being watched on each channel — some people watch an 
hour of ESPN a day; some people watch ten minutes — 
and so on. 
We did that for about five years of data.  
Again, there are lots of details that Ariel worked out 
for how to do it that we don’t have time to cover. 
[Slide] Then you get all that and then you 
run your simulation.  This is your but-for world.  You 
have your model, you have your parameters, and you 
just change something in the mathematical system to 
mimic what you want to examine. 
The key additional assumption here is that 
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the parameters are invariant to the change that you’re 
considering.  If you want to consider unbundling, the 
assumption is that if we were to force unbundling, 
people’s tastes wouldn’t change; people wouldn’t all 
of a sudden like more ESPN or like more The Weather 
Channel.  That’s the invariance assumption. 
[Slide] What we did here is we said in the 
context of the computer simulation: “Okay, cable 
providers, satellite providers, you can’t offer 
packages; you have to offer a price for each channel.” 
[Slide] Then we just ran the whole 
equilibrium and got back an answer.  You end up with 
tables like these.  One of the benefits of this is 
that you can talk about very specific outcomes for 
different types of agents. 
But, just focusing on the bottom, this is 
what we estimate under bundling, that 88 percent of 
the country was subscribing to cable.  Back then they 
were paying about $30 — this is year 2000 dollars — 
and we had measures for consumer surplus and industry 
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profits.   
Then we do the counterfactual simulation.  
We did two counterfactual simulations.  This one I’ll 
talk about later. 
This is a counterfactual simulation forcing 
bundling but holding all the prices of the content 
fixed.  They set a price.  Comcast has to offer à la 
carte pricing, but the price between Comcast and ESPN 
is fixed in the input rates.  There we predict that 
consumers would be way better off if you were to ban 
bundling. 
There is a next step in that, which I’m 
going to defer for a little bit, where we then add in 
the content market, and that’s the next part and the 
answers change.  But that’s the overall procedure. 
[Slide] The benefits: Integrate data with 
economic theory closely.  When you’re doing that you 
make the assumptions about each agent’s behavior 
explicit.  Often these legal discussions, or in the 
regression analysis, it’s very murky what assumptions 
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you’re actually making.  It’s hard to figure where the 
disagreement is.  You can stimulate outcomes for 
situations you haven’t seen before, and you can 
measure benefits that are defining the model, like 
consumer welfare. 
[Slide] The caveats:   
• They are computationally costly.  My 
papers take years to write.  The models sometimes take 
weeks to run, and then, if you want to change one 
thing and see what happens, that’s another three 
weeks.  It can get expensive. 
• Data requirements?  They don’t require 
that much different data than other — I actually think 
the data requirements are looser.  Through the context 
of the model you can bring in related data, but they 
are unforgiving when you have things like missing 
data.  If you’re missing data for one firm in the 
market, what do you do there?  It makes it very stark 
that you have a problem. 
• The final thing is, of course, economic 
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theory is not fully developed in many of these areas.  
We write down these models, multiple sets of 
assumptions that are a priori reasonable, and you 
start arguing about them, and then you’re in this —  
MR. KEYTE:  One question I have for you 
before we talk to the lawyers.  What if in your model, 
your counterfactual, you’re creating new vertical 
relationships that might result in double 
marginalization?  How do you model those things, 
changes in a sense — and maybe that’s what you were 
referring to in the content side — changes in the 
supply chain as part of your counterfactual? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  I want to talk about that.  
[Slide] I was talking about a but-for world 
where all you’re changing the distribution to 
consumers, and I said we’re holding fixed the content 
stuff.   
You asked me to talk about what’s ongoing 
and what’s coming up next, and that’s when I was going 
to talk about the upstream market in that context, but 
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I’ll definitely get to that. 
MR. KEYTE:  Let’s turn to the lawyers and 
first ask the basic question of Art and Ken: Did you 
know this was going on at all, and to what extent; and 
how have you been exposed to this kind of modeling 
versus what are just either straight regressions or 
natural experiments or just correlations?  What has 
been the exposure, if at all? 
MR. BURKE:  I think the answer is it’s 
fairly limited.  We can talk a little bit about the 
Major League Baseball (MLB)/National Hockey League 
(NHL) case that we worked on where this did play a 
central role.  But I would say that it did actually 
play a big role in the Cigna/Anthem case where the DOJ 
relied on this kind of modeling. 
But I would say it’s a bit bleeding edge, 
and it certainly is not as widely understood as a lot 
of other kinds of economic tools that lawyers are more 
familiar with, which is why I think this is a terrific 
panel to further clarify and expand the understanding 
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of this area. 
MR. KEYTE:  Ken? 
MR. SCHWARTZ:  Absolutely right.  It’s 
something we run across.  When I work with economists, 
we try to think about what all the arrows are we have 
in our quiver, and we always get a menu of “Here’s the 
different analyses we can do.” 
As an advocate, we’re also looking at 
budgets, and typically you’ll start with some basic 
observations and then go into more complicated 
regressions.  Always at the bottom the last couple of 
years was this merger simulation or some type of 
structural modeling.  Typically, there was an extra 
zero in the budget column, and frequently the 
economists would say, “It’s there and it’s worth 
exploring, but let’s hold off and see where the 
agencies are at.” 
MR. KEYTE:  Do you get a sense — and again, 
you mentioned the Cigna merger, where they did a 
hypothetical monopolist test with structural modeling, 
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and then the other side was using regressions — that 
historically the DOJ or the FTC are using more of 
this?   
Sometimes they have more time; they get a 
head start.  Sometimes they’re looking at the 
industry.  And they have more data; because they have 
subpoena power, they get more information.  Other than 
what you see that comes out in the occasional press 
release or something that’s litigated, how long have 
you been seeing them — we walk in, and they’re doing 
something you’re not doing? 
MR. BURKE:  I think it is something that you 
encounter with increasing frequency.  It does go to 
the fact that with subpoena power the agencies do have 
the ability to create more robust models than perhaps 
the parties do, given that they just perhaps have 
their own data and maybe the counterparties’ data.  
But they don’t have the rest of the marketplace.  So, 
it’s something where you’re always at a disadvantage. 
We’ve all been in those meetings where the 
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government says: “We’ve got this great model that 
shows your prices are going to go up, but we can’t 
really share it with you.  Just take it on faith.” 
MR. KEYTE:  Have you seen a distinction 
between — UPP, when we were first exposed to, it I 
realized that my daughter in seventh grade could 
easily do if I gave her two pieces of information — no 
offense to those who do a lot of UPP. 
Here you’re getting more to at least the 
possibility, depending on the data, of really saying: 
“Here’s how the current world is working from a demand 
side, from the cost or supply side.”  You remove 
something, and then — at least from some of the 
practitioners’ perspective — it gets a little murky.  
In the counterfactual, how much can you do in a sense 
beyond UPP where you hold all that static? 
MR. SCHWARTZ:  My reaction — and James and I 
wrote an article on UPP that was slammed by many 
critics out there — you don’t see the government 
presenting UPP as evidence at trial whereas you would 
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see these merger simulations being presented.  I know 
Aviv Nevo presented in Aetna/Humana, and the court 
said: “This is directionally correct.  It doesn’t have 
to tell me that there’s an exact price increase or 
what that price increase is, but it shows an 
incentive,” and taken together with the other evidence 
the court found that compelling. 
I still have yet to see the government stand 
in front of a judge and say, “Hey, we ran the UPPs; 
why are we here?” 
MR. BURKE:  To be fair, I think the UPP 
model was always designed to be a filter that was 
supposedly to tell you where you need to look in 
greater detail.  It wasn’t necessarily meant to be the 
ultimate predictor of whether a merger is 
anticompetitive or not. 
MR. KEYTE:  And there’s no doubt that some 
jurisdictions have made it more of a presumption than 
others. 
I haven’t really tested this question to see 
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whether any of you have views.  In AT&T/Time Warner —  
PROF. PAKES:  You should ask him about AT&T.  
MR. KEYTE:  I’m going to ask the question.  
What was that in Carl Shapiro’s model — and Dennis 
Carlton addressed it — where does it fit in the world 
of structuring model?  Is it 2.0, 3.0?  Is there a 
different 4.0?  But where does it fit?  We all read 
about it, we read about the model, and we know how it 
was criticized by the court, and we know it’s on 
appeal, so if you’re obviously on the matter — perhaps 
not. 
PROF. PAKES:  Can I ask you one thing before 
we do?  The only thing I want to point out is that 
computers have gotten a lot better.  They’re a lot 
faster.  No, quite seriously.  The data is better 
because of computers largely, and the people sitting 
at the DOJ and the FTC now have doctorates and have 
learned this stuff.  It’s true that it takes more time 
and it has not filtered through yet, but it’s going to 
be coming in.  That’s for sure. 
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MR. KEYTE:  I’ll ask it a two-part question.  
Does anybody have a view of what you would call that, 
where it fits in in AT&T/Time Warner?  And the second 
question is, what’s the next variation of that? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  Okay.  Those two tie into 
two or three slides I have here.  Is it all right? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  Thank you. 
[Slide] So you suggested that I talk about 
what’s coming next.  If you think about the sort of 
mode of analysis, it’s very general.  Merger 
simulation in a downstream market is the most-trodden 
path, but anything you can model and get data is 
potentially fair game.  That could be things like 
adding an upstream market, like the content makers.  
It could be adding dynamics like investment, product 
positioning, and entry and exit.  It could also be 
thinking about multiple complementary parts. 
Think about the input markets, which relates 
to AT&T/Time Warner.  If you could think about the 
mergers between — there was Dish/DirecTV in 2000, that 
 38 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
proposed merger, which was a horizontal merger there, 
and a horizontal merger with content going on. 
You can also fit vertical mergers into here, 
but then you have to extend the model to have the 
channels, and you have to talk about what are the 
actions and the chaos of the channels.  When we draw 
that out, it’s very complicated.  You can think about 
Comcast setting prices to consumers.  What’s going on 
there is a much more fee for negotiations.  Everything 
is interconnected, what Comcast does with ESPN affects 
DirecTV, and what DirecTV does with [inaudible].  
Everything is sort of in this interconnected 
bargaining world, so you need to model for that. 
[Slide] We’ve built models for that.  
They’re complicated, and that was the model that was 
at question in AT&T/Time Warner.  I don’t call that 
what the DOJ described.  It’s firmly in the world of 
structural modeling. 
There’s a question of how well done it was 
and whether that was the best evidence in that case, 
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how good the data was.  I’m not talking about that.  
I’m not trying to provide any support for that. 
But this is firmly in the world and fits 
into what we’re talking about.  They made a model that 
estimated the broader parameters, they simulated a 
vertical merger, and that’s how they came up with 
their numbers. 
[Slide] In bundling you had a similar thing. 
It wasn’t a vertical merger, but you watch it and take 
into account what happens when ESPN and the content 
makers react to the regulation.  When you do that you 
get numbers which are quite different.  In fact, we 
found that consumers are basically no better off on 
average.  The industry is a little bit better off, but 
consumers are no better off.  There are winners and 
losers, but on average we didn’t find anyone was 
better off for that data and that time period. 
Another two places, in addition to adding 
input markets, which I think are really important and 
you’re going to see over the next several years – 
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there are already people with their foot in the door, 
a lot of people knocking – is dynamics, such as 
entry/exit, channel quality.  Like in the bundling, I 
assume that all the channels would have the same 
quality after you ban bundling. 
In reality, some channels might go out of 
business and some new channels might enter.  Some 
channels might invest more; some channels might invest 
less.  That’s the world of dynamics.  You can model 
it, you can get data on it, and it fits.  The problem 
is it’s harder to model and it’s harder to get data on 
it because these are long-term outcomes that require 
many years of data. 
So, I would say that dynamics is the 
Achilles’ heel of this analysis at the moment for 
antitrust. 
[Slide] Another thing I think we’re going to 
see more of is models of mergers between complements.  
I studied TV, so there was Sony buying Columbia 
Pictures, a TV manufacturer buying a movie and TV 
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studio.  It wouldn’t surprise me if we see proposed 
mergers like Apple/Spotify, Samsung/Netflix, that sort 
of thing — maybe not those exact ones, but those are 
complementary product markets where you’ll have to 
model multiple product markets at once.  Again, if you 
can get data on it or write it down, it’s fair game. 
That’s where I think we’re going. 
MR. KEYTE:  Ariel, just to reiterate — 
because I think the critical threshold issue is if you 
can get data on it — is the idea that you have to get 
enough data to replicate, to solve, to calibrate, for 
the real-world environment in terms of price shares or 
other characteristics?  Is that the starting point? 
PROF. PAKES:  Let me just push on what Ali 
said and then I’ll come back to that. 
Parts of it, the dynamics, if you tell me 
who the entrant is going to be, I can evaluate entry 
in the same framework that I evaluated everything 
else.  I can tell you whether an entrant — you have to 
tell me who the entrant is, its characteristics, what 
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kind of product it has, but I can predict whether he 
or she will make profits or not. 
The issue that becomes difficult is when you 
don’t know what is about to come down the road — such 
as innovation and probably part of the content — we 
really don’t know what new content is coming.  And we 
don’t know the incentives, how the incentives will 
play out to generate new content. 
Moreover, it gets harder for R&D and for all 
of the technologically progressive issues.  It gets 
harder partly because when you’re doing research on a 
particular product or a particular way of doing 
something — it doesn’t matter how many observations 
you have, it may not be possible to do the thing, so 
errors don’t average out like in the law of large 
numbers.  Those kinds of things are the hard things. 
You shouldn’t get me wrong.  It doesn’t mean 
we can’t do any of them, but there are some that — 
 we can do entry.  We could do Ali’s 
changing of the supply chain if you tell me which one 
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is going to change.  Things like that we can do. 
On the data side, at some point you come 
down to the question: can you do better than the next-
best alternative?  That’s really the question.  We 
never get it right.  None of our structural models are 
right.  The world is just too complicated for that.  
But the question is: can we give you a better answer 
than the next-best alternative? 
You look at your data.  I can remember when 
General Motors asked me to do a dynamic of what would 
happen if we put in certain kinds of cars?  I told the 
vice-president, “You can do that better than me.”  
Right now we’re just not set up to do a good job on 
that. 
There is a play-off.  It depends what the 
other guy is — what can you get from the other way of 
doing it?  Can you do better the other way? 
I think HHIs, you might look at them, but 
you shouldn’t use them for anything detailed.  It’s 
just ridiculous. 
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There are other things you might know.  It 
might be from the documents that the firm produces 
you’ll know stuff.  There are lots of other ways of 
getting information, and it’s just a question of 
what’s better. 
MR. KEYTE:  Art, I wonder if it would be 
useful to talk a little bit about, in terms of 
information and data, the Laumann case, as it has been 
the only litigated case over is there a threshold met 
in terms of replicating the —  
MR. BURKE:  Yes.  It’s a very interesting 
case where this type of modeling was used in 
connection with class certification.  The issue in the 
case —  
MR. KEYTE:  And we three worked on it.  I 
guess we have to disclose that. 
MR. BURKE:  The issue in the case was 
similar to what Ali’s analysis was.  It was a kind of 
unbundling question but in a somewhat different 
context. 
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As folks may know, most of the sports 
leagues have rules that say that you can only 
broadcast your signal within your certain team radius, 
a certain designated market area (DMA), a certain 
metropolitan area, and if you live outside that 
metropolitan area, the only way you can get games from 
a team — if you’re a Yankees fan and you live in 
Florida, there is a certain number of games that are 
on national networks, but otherwise you can’t get the 
Yankees Entertainment and Sports (YES) Network with 
all of the games in Florida.  That’s not permitted by 
league rules to be sold.  The only way you can get 
those games is if you buy an out-of-league package, 
which includes not just the Yankees but all the other 
teams in Major League Baseball.  Let’s assume it’s 
pretty much similar for hockey and for basketball as 
well. 
The plaintiffs in the case argued that was 
anticompetitive and, similar to some of the 
legislative calls for unbundling, they argued that “If 
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I’m a Yankees fan in Florida, I should be able to buy 
just the Yankees.  I shouldn’t have to buy a bundle 
that includes a lot of teams that I don’t want to 
follow.” 
The difficulty in doing that is that there 
is no empirical evidence of what the world looks like 
when that happens, so there wasn’t any kind of 
benchmark.  A lot of things that we’re more familiar 
with as lawyers, the usual economic tools that we 
think of for proving common impact in an overcharge 
case — you say: “Well, there’s a 10 percent 
overcharge.  Who was hurt?” — that kind of simplistic 
stuff just wasn’t available. 
The plaintiffs actually used a version of 
the Yurukoglu-Crawford model and adapted it, or 
attempted to adapt it, for this unbundling scenario.  
It was obviously challenged on Daubert grounds, a 
class certification, on a whole host of issues. 
But the issue that got the most attention 
from the court was a question about whether there was 
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sufficient data to project the demand side.  We were 
talking about each of these models has a demand 
ecosystem and a supply, and you put them together and 
you get some kind of equilibrium. 
In this case the question was: was there 
sufficient evidence about consumer demand?  What came 
out was that there really wasn’t.  The judge concluded 
there was a very tiny sliver of data for actual 
consumers and that in the absence of other data it was 
necessary that the expert who was putting forth the 
model essentially created what he called “avatars,” 
which I thought was kind of a cool concept, but 
they’re not like the ones in the movie; they’re made-
up people. 
The way the court described it was that they 
were essentially “mathematical DNA.”  They were 
hypothetical people with made-up demand 
characteristics, but they weren’t really derived from 
actual real-world data. 
At the end of the day, the judge concluded 
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that that was insufficient.  Because of the 
deficiencies in the data, the model produced a number 
of anomalous outcomes, and that was a big source of 
dispute.  A big issue in the class certification 
hearing was that, because these avatars weren’t really 
created with real-world data but were just sort of 
mathematical DNA, when you ran the model and changed 
certain parameters it spit out a lot of results that 
didn’t make any sense.  That was a point which I think 
was very compelling to the court. 
What was interesting again, just to sum up, 
was the court said, “What should the plaintiff’s 
expert have done?” 
The answer was, “He should have gotten more 
data about consumer preferences.” He noted that the 
Yurukoglu-and-Crawford model was based upon a lot of 
consumer survey data, and that it is quite common in 
these kinds of models to go out and, if you’ve got a 
deficiency in data, not to make it up with 
mathematical DNA, but to actually try to get more 
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robust information from consumers about what their 
real-world preferences are. 
I think it’s probably likely, even though 
there were a host of other criticisms of the model, 
that if the plaintiffs’ expert had gone and done that, 
there’s a pretty good chance the court would have 
found the model sufficient to get past Daubert and 
probably sufficient to justify class certification. 
Certainly, there was no doubt that the model 
as a whole was broadly accepted.  It’s published in a 
scholarly journal, so the whole debate of class 
certification was not about is this kind of modeling 
acceptable.  That was taken as a given.   
It was: is the implementation appropriate?  
It was an interesting lesson in trying to apply those 
kinds of models in the real world. 
MR. KEYTE:  Ali and Ariel, there is a lot 
more to that, depending on what industry you’re 
looking at.  But how often, or is typical that you go 
out, whether it’s academics or part of a project, and 
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do these conjoint surveys or survey work to try to 
estimate demand?  I don’t know if you’d do it on the 
supply side. 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  We use any data that we 
think has integrity and would be useful for the 
analysis.  Sometimes in surveys you worry that people 
aren’t incentivized to answer in any meaningful way.  
But mostly we’re looking for what choices people made, 
what products they bought, and how much they paid for 
them. 
MR. KEYTE:  In the surveys do you try to 
import any change?  Are these surveys to try to derive 
some elasticities or —  
PROF. PAKES:  Conjoint analysis isn’t really 
a survey. 
MR. KEYTE:  Okay.  What is it? 
PROF. PAKES:  Conjoint analysis is you go to 
a person and ask them fifteen questions.  He never 
buys anything.  He has five seconds to think between 
each question.  He’s comparing very detailed things.  
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You might not believe the answers in the end to 
something like that. 
The surveys that I think Ali is talking 
about, and that we both use, are data about what 
people did actually purchase.  For example, if you’re 
doing healthcare, there is now a lot of data in the 
All-Payers Claims data.  You can see exactly who 
purchased what, what hospitals they went to.  You 
can’t name people, but you can do the demand analysis 
with a full set of data on a full state.  You know 
what everybody in that state did, what insurance 
company they were on, what the insurance company paid, 
and what they paid out of pocket — the works.  It’s 
available.  There are industries like that. 
For real surveys they actually go out and 
ask people what they bought, see what they bought in 
the past, and when they changed what they bought and 
things like that. 
MR. KEYTE:  We know, whether it’s in a 
merger context or a litigation context, that sometimes 
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it takes a handful of documents that can turn a case, 
that can turn a merger.   
In this modeling exercise, almost from the 
academic side, how do you deal with essentially 
qualitative evidence?  Is it just a lead if it can’t 
be reduced to data?  How do you deal with intent in 
business documents and emails and the kinds of things 
that often are attractive to courts or juries but may 
not be quantifiable? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  The only way I can think 
of using that is it might help you specify your model, 
how you lay out what the agents can and can’t do, and 
it might give you qualitative support for the 
assumptions in your model.  But I’m not quite sure 
without more context how to —  
MR. KEYTE:  What’s the difference between a 
specification and an assumption? 
PROF. PAKES:  I think the way you would use 
it is you’re going to do something, something in the 
world is going to change, and if some document says, 
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in response to that kind of action “I’ll do X,” then 
you have to model X. 
MR. KEYTE:  You have to. 
PROF. PAKES:  It makes sense to investigate 
X.  That’s the way we would use the documents. 
MR. KEYTE:  Then it’s explore data and then 
you might use it —  
PROF. PAKES:  You explore it in the context 
of your — they said they were going to do something, 
so you explore what the implication of that would be 
in the context of your model. 
MR. BURKE:  As the lawyer, I think then you 
would have to marshal the model with other evidence.  
I’m just a simple country lawyer.  I start with the 
documents.  We start with the win-loss data, and then 
you get some other stuff, and then maybe you have one 
of these models too, and hopefully they roughly all 
point in the same direction, and whichever one doesn’t 
you try to explain why it doesn’t.  You try to marshal 
as much evidence across all those different things.  
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It’s not just in isolation. 
MR. KEYTE:  And, Ken, in the merger context, 
in the old days you would have a shadow team that’s 
saying: “Well, let’s see how this works out.  I don’t 
necessarily want everybody to be exposed to that.”  Is 
there still that approach to modeling where you might 
have a testifying, you have a non-testifying, you have 
a whole separate —  
MR. SCHWARTZ:  It comes back to what’s the 
profile of the matter and again what’s the budget.  
But we certainly will Red Team our economists at 
times, go to a different economist shop and say, “Put 
on your government hat, put together the government’s 
best case,” so that you have some independent thought 
there. 
It’s also a way to present to your client: 
“If you’re thinking of litigating this challenge, 
here’s the government’s best case, and they’re getting 
it from someone who hasn’t spent the last year trying 
to develop the affirmative arguments.”  That does 
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happen.  That’s fairly common. 
MR. KEYTE:  In structural modeling, or 
whatever you called it, data-intensive modeling of 
some nature — it sounds like it can apply to anything 
where you have a counterfactual that you’re trying to 
explore, whether it’s a regulatory change, whether 
it’s antitrust related, non-antitrust related.  Are 
there any limits in a sense on what it could apply to? 
PROF. PAKES:  It’s just when you can apply 
it well.  It’s just a question of what you have in 
your hand that you can analyze it with, including 
documents, by the way. 
MR. KEYTE:  Whether it’s in a horizontal 
setting, vertical setting, mergers, class action, what 
do you see as, in a sense — and maybe this is an 
unfair question — the next big thing, a paper or work 
that’s going on now that might say, “Hey, this is a 
new aspect of structural modeling that’s going to 
stick and that is useful”?  There is always a lag, 
especially with the lawyers who are going to see 
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something, or the agencies, your grad students, 
yourselves.  What’s 4.0 of structural modeling? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  Stuff I talked about, 
dynamics.  People write papers with dynamics in, but I 
don’t think we’ve nailed it to the point where it’s 
being used in the court system credibly. 
Models of investment.  I have a PhD student 
I’m advising whose dissertation is about modeling 4G 
investment to model a mobile merger. 
PROF. PAKES:  My only comment on that is 
I’ve been saying dynamics is the next thing coming for 
the last fifteen years. 
MR. KEYTE:  Just to be clear, when you say 
“dynamics” what do you mean?  What’s the breadth of 
that? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  Like in the cable 
bundling, you ban bundling, you see what consumers 
buy; but then there’s another level where the content 
makers might change the quality of their content, the 
genres that they’re offering, the casts, that sort of 
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thing. 
MR. KEYTE:  It’s the effects from different 
agents that flow from what you’re changing. 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  It’ll take time to happen 
and change the product mix. 
PROF. PAKES:  It’s investments.  It’s 
development of new products and investment in the cost 
structure. 
MR. KEYTE:  In a dynamic environment, which 
from an antitrust perspective — at least if you were 
doing the defense side of things and you’re trying to 
assess market power — if you have dynamic markets, you 
say you can’t even assert that.  But in structural 
modeling you’re trying to capture that to the extent 
you can.  Is that fair? 
PROF. PAKES:  Yes.  Again, what Ali said is 
right, which is this is the place where if a lawyer 
asks me, I’m not sure I would know more than asking 
somebody in the industry who knows a lot about the 
industry.  Maybe I would.  It would depend on the 
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problem. 
MR. KEYTE:  Does the academic world in this 
kind of modeling try to keep track of how it’s playing 
out in the courts, whether it’s accepted, whether it’s 
this whole Daubert debate? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  I read all the testimony.  
I was actually working a little bit on the other side 
on that case, but I read all your guys’ testimony in 
the Laumann case. 
MR. KEYTE:  Well, they were using their 
model without using you. 
MR. BURKE:  That was their fatal mistake. 
MR. KEYTE:  It was their fatal mistake. 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  I was in the background. 
MR. KEYTE:  Any other comments about this 
relatively esoteric yet extremely fundamental, 
grounded topic? 
PROF. PAKES:  I have one comment, which is I 
think it’s actually easy to explain.  I could explain 
to you — we didn’t do it today — exactly how the 
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demand system works.  It’s easy to explain when you 
understand it. 
It’s harder to do because there are a lot of 
details.  There are just a lot of things that have to 
fit together, but the basic principles of it are 
actually very simple, and the reason we went after the 
issues we went after in detail are actually very easy 
to explain. 
For example, in BLP the major issue is an 
ability to allow, especially in retail goods, an 
unobserved product characteristic because you can’t 
put in all the characteristics of a car.  The 
unobserved product characteristic, because it’s 
everything that you don’t measure, is probably 
correlated with price.  What BLP does is it allows you 
to do that. 
I could explain to you every detail in a way 
that you understand it.  It’s not magic. 
MR. KEYTE:  I would have to take your class. 
PROF. PAKES:  No, you wouldn’t.  You 
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wouldn’t have to do it; you’d just have to understand 
what’s going on.  It’s very simple ideas. 
MR. KEYTE:  I have one more technical 
question. 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  I agree.  What all this is 
is really just organized common sense.  We’re running 
down our assumptions, we’re bringing in the data, and 
we’re putting it all together in explicit fashion.  
Sometimes people think that’s just too fancy, too 
complicated, but I really think of it as just 
organized common sense. 
MR. KEYTE:  If somebody goes and reads, some 
of this has been worked out both academically and in 
some of the decisions, and they will run across the 
generalized method of moments. 
PROF. PAKES:  Ali just finished telling you 
what it is.  You take the data. 
MR. KEYTE:  And somebody won the Nobel 
Prize. 
PROF. PAKES:  You have a model, and the 
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model has a bunch of parameters that have to be fit; 
you find the parameters that make it look like the 
data and those are the right parameters.  That’s all 
method of moments is.  He got a Nobel Prize for that. 
MR. KEYTE:  He did.  You start with just, is 
it the intuition or qualitative information that says, 
“Eh, I think this is something that it may match”? 
PROF. YURUKOGLU:  No.  It’s all these 
methods on the computer.  There are automated ways of 
doing that. 
MR. KEYTE:  Let’s open it up to questions.  
Guy, identify yourself because we have a record. 
QUESTION [Guy Ben-Ishai]:  I’m Guy Ben-Ishai 
with The Brattle Group as well. 
You actually mentioned something that 
resonated with me.  You mentioned a scenario where the 
model that was applied to the litigation was 
essentially the very same model that was developed and 
perhaps even received some legitimacy or was 
certified, if you will, in academic research. 
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What’s really interesting about structural 
models — and I was wondering, Ali — really is that in 
most scenarios that’s not the case.   
What we do know about the model is, contrary 
to what we saw if you were working a PhD in industrial 
and organizational psychology in the 1990s, or twenty 
or fifteen years ago perhaps, you weren’t going to 
look at a merger and HHI and concentration.  That 
applies to such a wide range of industries.  I 
understand how it would be very generic, it would be 
very broad because it has much more than just a system 
of thinking about these issues. 
But what we see now with the structural 
models is that they’re so highly specified that it’s 
not just a specific issue, at least to an industry — 
although this is not something we’ve mentioned — that 
typically when you work on these models they’re not 
necessary the very same model that I would even say 
frequently was published before. 
I guess the question is: as an attorney, how 
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do you claim confidence that this is indeed a 
reasonable model; and for an economist, how do you get 
enough confidence to actually convince the court that, 
yes this is the right model for this case? 
MR. BURKE:  As the attorney, I will answer 
that.  I don’t think that in order to advance a model 
the particular model has to have been published.  Even 
in the case of Laumann, it was a version of the model 
that was then tweaked. 
But I think there are many cases where a 
model is created specifically for a litigation or for 
a particular merger.  Assuming it follows the 
methodologies that have been broadly accepted in the 
industry, I think it’s potentially a valid model.  I 
don’t think you need to have a particular industry 
modeled in a published paper in order to be able to 
use modeling in a litigation or a merger. 
MR. KEYTE:  Any other questions? 
[No response] 
Thank you to the panel.  A very interesting 
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topic, and there will be more in the months and years 
to come.  Thank you very much. 
[Adjourned: 4:33 p.m.] 
